


July 17, 2022

# Greenwood Police Department

*After Action Report*

*Greenwood Park Mall Shooting*



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Memoriam .....	2
2. Introduction .....	3
3. Acronyms.....	5
4. Annexes.....	6
Annex A - 911 Center.....	7
Annex B - Initial Response.....	9
Annex C - Tactical Operation.....	15
Annex D- Unified Command/Communication/Interoperability.	19
Annex E- Media Relations.....	24
Annex F - Criminal Investigation.....	27
Annex G – Support Services.....	32
Annex H – Victims Assistance.....	35
6. Closing.....	39



## MEMORIAM

On behalf of all of the agencies that responded to the Greenwood Park Mall shooting on July 17, 2022 the Greenwood Police Department offers our sincerest condolences to the families affected by this senseless tragedy. Below are the names of the innocent lives lost.



**Those Lost**  
**Rosa Rivera De Pineda**  
**Pedro Pineda**  
**Victor Jesus Gomez**

Our thoughts and prayers are also with the three victims injured during this tragedy. To respect their privacy, their names will not be listed.





## Introduction

On July 17, 2022 at approximately 4:54pm a gunman entered the Greenwood Park Mall located at 1251 N. U.S Highway 31 in Greenwood Indiana. The gunman entered the food court restroom with a backpack containing a Sig Sauer model 400M rifle, a Smith and Wesson M&P15 rifle, and a Glock model 33 handgun. Also in his possession was six fully loaded 5.56 magazines and 2 Glock 33 magazines.

At 5:56pm the gunman exited the restroom with the Sig Sauer rifle. He immediately shot Victor Gomez outside of the restroom. The gunman then fired into the food court, killing Pedro and Rosa Pineda who were seated at a table eating dinner. Three other people were injured by rounds fired by the gunman as they attempted to flee the food court.

A legally armed citizen carrying a Glock model 19 handgun immediately engaged the gunman from a distance of 40 yards. The armed citizen fired ten rounds, striking the gunman eight times. The gunman was fatally injured and fell to the ground as he attempted to retreat back into the restroom. From the time the gunman exited the bathroom until he was neutralized by the armed citizen was approximately 15 seconds.

The following law enforcement agencies responded to the scene: Greenwood Police Department, Johnson County Sheriff's Department, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, Indiana State Police, Franklin Police Department, Marion County Sheriff's Department, Bartholomew County Sheriff's Department, Columbus Police Department, Martinsville Police Department, Southport Police Department, ATF, FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security. The Greenwood Police Department took command of this incident. The investigation was conducted by the Greenwood Police Department with support from the FBI.

The City of Greenwood is a southern suburb of Indianapolis with a population of 63,830. The Greenwood Police Department at full staffing has 74 full-time sworn police officers. This incident happened four minutes prior to shift change, so both day shift and night shift officers responded. In total there were 19 Greenwood PD officers on-duty when this incident was dispatched. This included two lieutenants and one sergeant who was working off-duty at the mall.

The nature of this incident combined with the size of the primary crime scene, number of persons injured/killed, number of witnesses, and the amount of evidence to be processed stressed the capabilities and resources of a midsized police department.



The purpose of this after action report is to provide a transparent and constructive review of the challenges faced, vulnerabilities realized, and to highlight the strengths of our law enforcement response to this incident.

The information in this after action report was comprised from multiple sources including a collaborative multi-agency debriefing, personal observations, investigative reports, interviews, and digital evidence.



## **Acronym List**

<b>ATF</b>	<b>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives</b>
<b>CAD</b>	<b>Computer Aided Dispatch</b>
<b>EAP</b>	<b>Employee Assistance Program</b>
<b>FBI</b>	<b>Federal Bureau of Investigation</b>
<b>FPD</b>	<b>Franklin Police Department</b>
<b>GPD</b>	<b>Greenwood Police Department</b>
<b>IMPD</b>	<b>Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department</b>
<b>ISP</b>	<b>Indiana State Police</b>
<b>JCSO</b>	<b>Johnson County Sheriff's Office</b>
<b>PIO</b>	<b>Public Information Officer</b>



## **ANNEXES**

This after action report is comprised of (8) annexes:

**Annex A. – 911 Center/Dispatching Incident:** Provides a review of the operational challenges that 911 operators faced during this incident.

**Annex B. – Initial Response:** Provides a review of the initial law enforcement response to this incident. It includes viewpoints and recommendations from the initial responding police units.

**Annex C. – Tactical Operation:** Provides a review of the tactical operations during this incident. It consists of SWAT Operations performed by Greenwood PD SWAT, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department SWAT, and Indiana State Police SWAT. It also consists of tactical operations performed by the Johnson County Sheriff's Office Bomb Squad and the Indiana State Police Bomb Squad.

**Annex D. – Unified Command/Communication/ Interoperability:** Provides a review of the command implementation, and efficiency throughout the incident. This section also reviews the communication and interoperability throughout the incident.

**Annex E. – Media Relations:** Provides a review of the massive local and national media response, press conferences, and politicization of this incident.

**Annex F. – Criminal Investigation:** Provides a review of the investigative process conducted by the Greenwood Police Department, FBI, ATF, Johnson County Sheriff's Office, and Franklin Police Department.

**Annex G. – Support Services:** Provides a review of the support functions provided to first responders during and after this incident.

**Annex H. – Victim's Assistance** Provides a review of the assistance made available to the victims and their families.



# ANNEX A





## **ANNEX A. – 911 CENTER**

The Johnson County 911 Center received (98) 911 calls in the first 30 minutes of this incident. This completely overwhelmed the eight dispatchers on-duty at the time. To show the significance of this call volume influx, the previous Sunday during the same 30 minute time span the 911 center received 3 emergency calls.

### **Topic**

**(A.T.1) Call Rollover Contingency Plan**

### **Discussion**

The Johnson County 911 Center has a contingency plan in place for incidents that generate more emergency call volume than what the center can handle. If all 911 lines are busy, callers are automatically transferred to the Bartholomew County 911 Center. During the first 30 minutes of this incident Johnson County 911 operators answered (65) 911 calls and (33) 911 calls were routed to Bartholomew County 911.

Bartholomew County 911 Operators were not aware that the contingency plan was activated and they began transferring callers back to Johnson County 911. This was a futile exercise for several minutes as many of the callers were rerouted back to Bartholomew County due to all Johnson County 911 lines remaining busy.

### **Recommendations**

**(A.R.1)** 911 Center contingency operation plans should be a topic of routine training.

**(A.R.2)** Software updates should be installed to ensure that 911 operators are alerted when a contingency plan is activated.

### **Topic**

**(A.T.2) Dispatcher Off-duty Availability**

### **Discussion**

Two additional dispatchers were called in and responded to the Johnson County 911 Center expeditiously. This allowed two supervisors to leave the center to conduct the dispatch operations within the Mobile Command Vehicle.

### **Recommendations**

**(A.R.3)** Dispatch Centers should maintain an on-call schedule that provides for a quick response of additional man power when needed.



# ANNEX B



## **ANNEX B. – INITIAL RESPONSE**

The primary responsibility of law enforcement officers responding to an active shooter incident is to immediately locate and eliminate the active threat. Once the threat has been neutralized, an initial sweep of the area must be conducted to ensure that there are not additional threats. When the area has been cleared, first aid can be rendered to the wounded. The crime scene must also be contained and preserved.

### **Topic**

**(B.T.1)          Emergency vehicle operation**

### **Discussion**

There are many factors that contribute to an increased likelihood that first responders may be involved in an automobile accident while driving to the scene of an active shooter incident. These factors include but are not limited to physiological responses to high stress situations, multiple emergency vehicles converging on a single location, and panicked citizens attempting to flee the area.

There were approximately sixteen police, fire, and EMS agencies that responded to this incident. There were no reports of vehicular accidents as a result of this response. It should be noted that the first police unit on the scene was at the mall in an off-duty employment role at the time of the shooting. The first responding officers arrived one minute and fifty-eight seconds after the call was dispatched.

### **Recommendations**

**(B.R.1)          Continue to follow department policy governing emergency vehicle operations.**

**(B.R.2)          Continue to offer annual practical training in Emergency Vehicle Operations.**

### **Topic**

**(B.T.2)          Ballistic Vests/Issued Equipment**

### **Discussion**

All GPD officers are issued level IV ballistic vests that are safety rated to stop 5.56 rifle ammunition. All GPD officers are also issued and trained to carry 5.56 patrol rifles in their squad cars. A review of security video and officers body worn camera video showed that not all officers who responded to this incident took the time to put their level IV ballistic vests on prior to entering the mall. It was also noted that one of the first responding officers did not deploy his issued patrol rifle prior to entering the mall.



That officer was armed only with his service pistol, a Glock model 17. Failure to utilize the agency issued level IV ballistic vests and patrol rifle put officers in a tactical disadvantage against an assailant armed with a rifle.

### **Recommendation**

- (B.R.3)** Officers should ensure that their level IV ballistic vests are easily accessible either in the passenger compartment or trunk of their patrol vehicle.
- (B.R.4)** In-service active shooter training should include the deployment and proper wearing of the level IV ballistic vests. It should also be reinforced that the benefit of deploying the level IV vest outweighs the minimal time saved by entering an active shooter incident without it.
- (B.R.5)** Policy states that officers are required to have all issued department equipment readily available to deploy while on-duty. Supervisors should routinely inspect patrol vehicles on the shift level to ensure that all issued equipment including the patrol rifle is present and in good working order.

### **Topic**

- (B.T.3)** **Parking of emergency vehicles**

### **Discussion**

The hundreds of emergency vehicles that converged on the Greenwood Park Mall in response to this incident created entry and egress issues. Parked police vehicles made it difficult for critical apparatus and equipment to access designated locations.

### **Recommendations**

- (B.R.6)** Implement “parking of police vehicles” into active shooter training. Reinforce the importance of parking in a manner that does not restrict access to incoming fire apparatus, ambulances, tactical vehicles, and mobile command vehicles.

### **Topic**

- (B.T.4)** **Self-Reporting Law Enforcement Officers**



## Discussion

Many off-duty police officers responded to the mall upon hearing the report of an active shooter. Most of these officers were wearing plain clothes and armed with firearms. This poses a significant risk to the self-reporting officer of being mistaken by on-duty officers as the assailant.

## Recommendations

- (B.R.7)** Police personnel should be issued level IV ballistic vests displaying clear markings that identify that person as a law enforcement officer. These vests should be kept in an easily accessible location in the police vehicle at all times. In situations where an off-duty officer does not have access to protective equipment containing identifiers, then that officer should verbally identify himself or herself to each person they encounter during an active shooter incident.

## Topic

- (B.T.5)** Initial clearing procedures

## Discussion

All shots fired in this incident were contained to the food court. This is the location that all of the deceased and wounded, including the gunman were located. Initial 911 callers provided information that the shooter was walking towards Applebee's. Applebee's is on the opposite side of the mall from the food court. First arriving officers responded to the Applebee's corridor which slowed response time to the food court. Upon officers arrival in the food court they encountered mall security and Elisjscha Dicken. They were informed that the gunman was down near the restroom and they also observed the victims down. Officers initially bypassed Dicken to ensure that the gunman was no longer a threat. Officers then immediately proned Dicken on the floor and disarmed him. Dicken was handcuffed and escorted out of the mall. Multiple officers then quickly began clearing the restrooms and surrounding businesses while escorting shoppers and employees to safety. Among those escorted out were the family members of one of the victims.



## Recommendations

- (B.R.8) When escorting witnesses or bystanders through a crime scene make every effort to keep them out of view of disturbing images.
- (B.R.9) When escorting a suspect or person involved out of an active shooter crime scene officers must be prepared for hostile encounters from witnesses, the public, or victims' family members.
- (B.R.10) The first officers on the scene in the food court bypassed Elisjsa Dicken to confirm that the gunman was no longer a threat. In hindsight and not to discard officer intuition, Mr. Dicken should have been disarmed and secured in handcuffs prior to officers moving past him.
- (B.R.11) Officers performing the initial clearing of the crime scene practiced excellent clearing tactics. In-service active shooter training should incorporate approved room clearing tactics and safety concerns such as muzzle discipline.

## Topic

- (B.T.6) **Providing first aid to victims**

## Discussion

From the time the first shot was fired until the officers cleared the hot zone and began providing first aid to the wounded was 8 minutes and 45 seconds. This was actually a very good response time considering the inaccurate information received concerning the shooters location and the clearing/safety tasks that had to be completed before first aid could safely be administered. Officers then requested the Greenwood Fire Departments Tactical EMS team enter the food court. There was a short delay in response from the EMS team as their active shooter response policy requires that they be escorted into the crime scene by law enforcement. Once Fire Command relayed this information to law enforcement via radio, officers met the EMS team and escorted them inside.

## Recommendations

- (B.R. 12) Future active shooter training sessions should include wounded role players and simulate a coordinated response between police and fire. Detailed discussions should take place during these training sessions to highlight each entities roles and policies for active shooter incidents.





**(B.R.13)** All Greenwood Police Officers are equipped with trauma kits including tourniquets. After action reviews revealed that officers quickly expended their supplies while treating the wounded. Additional first aid supplies were requested.

**Topic**

**(B.T.7) Outer Perimeter**

**Discussion**

The timing of this incident was beneficial in that the mall closed at 6:00pm that Sunday night. Vehicular traffic and the number of cars in the parking lot was light. The outer perimeter was established approximately 50 yards east of the mall from Dicks Sporting Goods to Sears. Crime scene tape was used to mark the perimeter and police officers were stationed along the outer perimeter for security.

**Recommendations**

**(B.R.14)** During after action debriefings, officers assigned to the perimeter noted that the perimeter was established too close to the command post. They cited concerns that many resources including the mobile command vehicle, and tactical apparatus would have been easy targets for someone who wished to carry out a secondary attack. Suggestions were made to push the perimeter out at least 100 yards from the command post.

**(B.R.15)** It was also noted that members of the media were found inside the perimeter using cells phones to capture video. Recommendations were made to assign more officers to the perimeter to control this type of breach.



# ANNEX C



## **ANNEX C- TACTICAL OPERATIONS**

The Greenwood Park Mall covers over 1.2 million square feet. When the shooting began many stores were secured where the employees and customers sheltered in place. Due to the vast size of the property and the number of stores and restaurants multiple tactical teams were needed to conduct secondary searches. SWAT teams from IMPD, ISP, and GPD carried out these secondary searches. GPD SWAT also responded to the gunman's apartment after clearing the mall.

Bomb squads from the JCSO and ISP were utilized to clear the gunman's backpack and apartment of explosives.

### **Topic**

**(C.T.1)            Activation of special tactical teams**

### **Discussion**

GPD SWAT consists of a team leader, two assistant team leaders, ten officers, and two medics. At the time of this incident three of the SWAT team members were working shift and were involved in the initial response. The remaining team members were activated and responded from home. Once activated, GPD SWAT convened at the Greenwood Police Training Center to gather equipment. The SWAT team then responded to the mall from that location.

ISP SWAT and the ISP Bomb Squad are stationed at the Greenwood Municipal Airport which is approximately 2.2 miles east of the Greenwood Park Mall. Due to this incident occurring on a Sunday evening both teams responded from their homes.

The Greenwood Park Mall is located approximately one block south of the Greenwood/Indianapolis boarder. Due to the close proximity, multiple IMPD SWAT members were part of the initial response. Those who were not part of the initial response were activated by IMPD command.

### **Recommendations**

**(C.R.1)**            The Johnson County 911 Center, and all county law enforcement agencies should work together to implement policy that would mandate mass notification to all law enforcement personnel when there is an active shooter or mass casualty incident anywhere in the county. This would improve response times of off-duty personnel.



**(C.R.2)** Tactical teams responding to active shooter incidents should respond directly to the scene. Individual members should be tasked to retrieve specialized equipment/vehicles and bring those to the scene as needed.

**(C.R.3)** Dispatch personnel should sound alert tones prior to announcing any changing or reassigning of radio talk groups/channels.

**Topic**

**(C.T.2) Accessibility/Maps/Layouts of Greenwood Park Mall**

**Discussion**

While conducting secondary searches, SWAT personnel found many stores and restaurants locked with no employees on site. As a result several exterior doors were breached. SWAT team leaders from outside agencies also noted that having maps or blueprints readily available would have been beneficial.

**Recommendations**

**(C.R.4)** Law enforcement agencies should acquire maps or digital layouts of all high profile locations within a jurisdiction. They should also coordinate with upper level management of high profile locations to either acquire keys, passcodes, or direct contact numbers for key holders.

**Topic**

**(C.T.3) Marking of cleared spaces**

**Discussion**

Due to the size of the mall, it was imperative that tactical teams performing secondary searches clearly mark all locations that had been searched. There was not a consistent method being used. For example one team was marking doors with a marker and another team was dropping glow sticks in front of the entrance.



### **Recommendation**

- (C.R.5)** A uniform method of marking entrances should be adopted by regional law enforcement agencies. It would also be beneficial if all high profile locations partner with law enforcement to have sliding placards placed above entry points to signify that a room has been cleared.

### **Topic**

- (C.T.4)** Tactical interoperability

### **Discussion**

The three SWAT teams performing the secondary clearing of the mall were operating on three different radio channels. The teams communicated with each other primarily through face-to-face contact at a rally point in the center of the mall.

### **Recommendation**

- (C.R.5)** Future active shooter trainings should include the implementation of a unified tactical command post. A team leader from each participating tactical team should be present at the tactical command post. This provides an efficient means to coordinate responses and improve communication.



# ANNEX D





## **ANNEX D. – UNIFIED COMMAND/COMMUNICATION/ INTEROPERABILITY**

### **Introduction**

Sixteen local, state, and federal agencies responded to this incident. The need to quickly establish a Unified Command Post was critical due to the size of this incident, number of agencies involved, and the multitude of operational objectives occurring simultaneously.

The On-duty Greenwood Fire Department Battalion Chief established fire command immediately upon his arrival on the southwest corner of Dicks Sporting Goods. The first law enforcement officer to establish command was a GPD night shift lieutenant who was outside Entrance 4 near Sears. Twenty-nine minutes into the incident an IMPD sergeant asked if command has been established. He did not receive a response and advised that he was establishing command under the Sears canopy. Then two minutes later the Greenwood Police Chief arrived on the scene and asked for the location of the unified command post. Dispatch informed the Chief that command post was at the southwest corner of Dicks Sporting Goods. Upon the Chiefs arrival he located fire command, but police command was not present. The Greenwood Police Chief then established unified command with the fire department. Unified Command was moved to the Sears Canopy where commanding officers from each agency worked together out of the Johnson County Mobile Command Vehicle.

First responders from three outside counties, (Marion, Morgan, and Bartholomew) responded to this incident. Therefore it was necessary to establish radio patches through the use of mutual aid channels to ensure communication interoperability. There was also the need for multiple event channels due to tactical operations inside the mall.

### **Topic**

**(D.T.1)            Mass Notification of Active Shooter Incident**

### **Discussion**

Many off-duty officers found out about the incident through social media and breaking news. A mass notification was not pushed out to first responders.

### **Recommendations**

**(D.R.1)**            When there is an active shooter or mass casualty incident the Communications Center should immediately send a mass notification to all Johnson County first responders. This allows for quicker self-reporting times, and lessons the likelihood that conflicting information is dispersed.



## Topic

### **(D.T.2) Establishing Unified Command**

## Discussion

Upon arrival to any major incident, police and fire command must be united. Although police and fire commanders both established command upon arrival of this incident, it was nearly 30 minutes before they linked up to establish Unified Command.

## Recommendations

- (D.R.2)** Law enforcement personnel should receive continual training on NIMS. Specifically, training related to incident command structure.
- (D.R.3)** Active shooter training must incorporate incident command and contain practical exercises related to multi-agency interoperability.

## Topic

### **(D.T.3) Mobile Command Post**

## Discussion

The need for incident commanders to have a secure location equipped with the infrastructure necessary to accomplish mission critical tasks is paramount. The Johnson County Mobile Command Post arrived on the scene quickly. This vehicle provides work stations for 8 incident commanders and two dispatchers.

## Recommendations

- (D.R.4)** Command posts often have limited space and resources. It is important to limit access to only those who are directly in command of the incident. Too many people in a command post can result in excessive noise and confusion.

## Topic

### **(D.T.4) Federal Resources**

## Discussion

It was evident early into this incident that federal resources would be needed. Approximately 30 minutes into the incident, command requested federal assistance. Agents from the local FBI, ATF, and the Department of Homeland Security responded.



At the request of GPD, the FBI provided a rapid response evidence collection team, and the ATF assisted with tracing the firearms.

### **Recommendations**

**(D.R.5)** Agencies should request assistance from their federal law enforcement partners early into an active shooter incident. Federal agencies have the personnel and resources to provide a wide variety of support to local agencies when investigating a major incident such as an active shooter.

### **Topic**

**(D.T.5) Radio Traffic Interruptions**

**Discussion** There were multiple interruptions classified as “busy” or “rejects” in radio traffic. The “busy” interruptions resulted from the radio tower being overwhelmed. The “reject” interruptions resulted from multiple units attempting to talk at the same time.

### **Recommendations**

**(D.R.6)** Radio usage should be kept to a minimum and reserved for only mission critical information. This is especially important during early stages of the incident.

**(D.R.7)** As soon as possible, special event channels should be assigned to tactical operations work groups. This will help to alleviate radio interruptions due to “rejects”.

**(D.R.8)** Large structures like the Greenwood Park Mall often present communication challenges due to radio signals being disrupted by the massive amounts of steel & concrete they have to penetrate. Consider installing bi-directional amplifiers on high priority locations that present communication barriers.

At the time of this incident the City of Greenwood and the Greenwood Park Mall were partnering to have a bi-directional amplifier installed at the mall. This project was scheduled to be completed in late 2022.

### **Topic**

**(D.T.6) Self-Reporting LEO Staging**



## Discussion

The massive response of Law Enforcement Officers who responded to this incident while off duty, created a significant challenge to keep track of who they were and what they were doing. Early into this incident a Greenwood Police Sergeant established a self-reporting LEO staging area approximately 75 yards east of the command post at Sears Automotive. This information was broadcast on the primary incident radio channel. Despite these efforts most self-reporting officers responded directly to the Command Post.

## Recommendations

- (D.R.9) If possible, establish the self-reporting LEO staging location as close to the outer perimeter main point of entry.
- (D.R.10) Utilize signage that makes the staging location easily identifiable.
- (D.R.11) Incorporate self-reporting officers into active shooter training. It should be made clear to officers during training what is expected of them and where they should go if responding while off-duty.
- (D.R.12) Ensure that the staging area is adequately staffed.
- (D.R.13) For long lasting incidents consider needs such as restrooms, food, and water.

## Topic

- (D.T.7) **Reunification/Family Notification**

## Discussion

A reunification site was established at the Greenwood Police Training Center which is located less than a mile west of the Greenwood Park Mall. Information concerning the reunification site was dispersed through social media and news outlets. The site was staffed with detectives and mental health professionals. Due to the nature of this incident this site was not utilized by family members of the victims. Most went directly to the hospitals.

## Recommendations

- (D.R.14) Agencies should preplan reunification site locations for all high priority targets within their jurisdictions. Considerations should include size, staffing, transportation, and access to food, water, and restrooms.



# ANNEX E



## **ANNEX E – MEDIA RELATIONS**

### **Introduction**

The media arrived on the scene of this incident within minutes. Within the first hour reporters from every major Indianapolis area news outlet had arrived at the mall. The story was also breaking on national news outlets.

### **Topic**

**(E.T.1)            Media Staging**

### **Discussion**

It was imperative to quickly designate a staging area for the media to gather. This staging area was established in the parking lot of New York Slice Pizza which was just outside of the outer perimeter. It was in view of the command post, but at a distance that would not cause interference with the investigation.

### **Recommendation**

**(E.R.1)**            The media must be assigned a designated location to gather. The location should provide a limited view of operations and be outside of the perimeter.

### **Topic**

**(E.T.2)            PIO Collaboration**

### **Discussion**

Public information officers from GPD, IMPD, and ISP worked together in the early stages of this incident. The first address to the media was made by IMPD at the request of GPD. The IMPD PIO confirmed that there was an active shooter incident and that additional details would be provided by GPD in one hour.

### **Recommendation**

**(E.R.2)**            PIO's from all involved agencies should work together. One PIO should be selected to be the single point of contact to the media. This will ensure that messages are consistent and that conflicting statements are not disseminated.





## Topic

**(E.T.3) Media Briefings**

## Discussion

Two briefings were given at the scene by the Greenwood Police Chief. The first was 90 minutes into the incident and the second was one hour after the first. Each briefing was previously scheduled. Scheduling the briefings an hour apart kept members of the media in the staging area, and allowed time for additional information to be obtained. At the conclusion of the second briefing the media was informed that a press conference would be held at 2:00pm the following day.

## Recommendation

**(E.R.3)** It is important to keep the media informed throughout the incident and investigation. Schedule regular briefing updates/press conferences. Provide only factual information and refrain from offering opinions.

## Topic

**(E.T.4) Politicization**

## Discussion

Active shooter incidents often spark heated political debates concerning gun control. This was especially true with this incident as a result of the gunman being killed by a lawfully armed citizen. This issue was brought up multiple times during press conferences, and was the topic of discussion on many national talk shows.

## Recommendations

**(E.R.4)** Do not engage in political debates. Stick to providing facts and circumstances surrounding the incident.



# ANNEX F



# **ANNEX F – CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION**

## **Introduction**

The Greenwood Police Investigations Division was responsible for the criminal investigation of this incident. The GPD Investigations Division consists of a Deputy Chief, Detective Sergeant, eight detectives, one deputy US Marshall, one crime scene specialist, and one crime analyst.

Due to the magnitude of this incident many agencies assisted in the investigation. Detectives from IMPD, ISP, and the JCSO assisted with witness interviews at the scene. Evidence Technicians from GPD, Franklin PD, JCSO, and the FBI worked together to process both crime scenes. The ATF assisted with conducting the investigation of the guns collected.

The FBI worked closely with GPD detectives throughout this investigation. They played a pivotal role assisting with crime scene processing, electronic evidence extraction/analysis, and general investigative duties.

## **Topic**

**(F.T.1)**

### **Witness Interviews**

## **Discussion**

Many of the witnesses who were in the food court at the time of the shooting had fled the mall property prior to the arrival of first responders. Several others remained in the parking lot, or sheltered in place throughout the mall. It was imperative that all witnesses were interviewed as quickly as possible by investigators.

Witnesses who remained on the scene were asked to meet with detectives under the Sears canopy due to the inclement weather. Detectives took statements from these witnesses and retrieved contact information so that follow-ups could be completed if necessary.

Information was distributed through news outlets and social media requesting anyone who witnessed or had information regarding the incident to respond to the Greenwood Police Training Center to speak to investigators. The training center was staffed with detectives from multiple agencies along with mental health professionals.

## **Recommendations**

**(F.R.1)**

Inform witnesses not to discuss what they saw or heard with other witnesses prior to speaking to investigators. Hearing someone else's account of what happened may alter the witness's perception of what they observed.



**(F.R.2)** Consider setting up a hotline staffed with detectives to take statements over the telephone. The 911 Center received several calls from witnesses who did not want to leave the comfort of their home to give a statement.

**(F.R.3)** Large scale incidents that require investigators from multiple agencies to simultaneously conduct interviews, should have a dedicated Investigations Command Post. This provides a central location for information sharing, and task delegation among investigators.

### Topic

**(F.T.2) Crime Scene Processing- Early Stages**

### Discussion

In the very early stages of this incident there was a push from within the command center to expedite the retrieval of identification from the body of the gunman and also to acquire serial numbers from the gunman's weapons. Although time was of the essence to accomplish these tasks, it was determined that it was more important to properly photograph and preserve the integrity of the evidence/crime scene prior to collecting these items.

### Recommendations

**(F.R.4)** Decisions to expedite the investigative process due to exigencies should be cleared by the incident commander prior to actions be taken. Absent extreme circumstances efforts should be made to preserve the integrity of the crime scene/evidence prior to collection.

### Topic

**(F.T.3) Crime Scene Processing**

### Discussion

It was clear early into this incident that the crime scene processing capabilities of the Greenwood Police Department would be tested due to the size of the two crime scenes and quantity of evidence to be collected.

Assistance from the FBI's Evidence Response Team was requested. The JCSO and FPD also provided evidence technicians and equipment. In all, 17 evidence technicians processed the mall food court and the gunman's apartment. They collected 190 pieces of evidence, 31 pieces of personal property, took 449 photos, and a 3D scan of the mall foot court.



## Recommendations

- (F.R.5) Smaller agencies should be aware of the Federal/regional resources available to them and how to request assistance.
- (F.R.6) Interagency collaboration should be ensured by establishing clearly defined tasks and responsibilities prior to processing.
- (F.R.7) Consider utilizing an assembly line model for processing. Assign personnel to specific tasks: item collection, photography, bagging/labeling, loading, and transporting. This proved to be very effective in this incident.
- (F.R.8) Prepare for large complex incidents by stocking up on specialized supplies including evidence collection bags, boxes, tape, stickers, swabs, personal protection equipment, cameras, spare batteries, and other specialized equipment/supplies as needed.
- (F.R.9) Prepare in advance for the storing of large quantities of blood soaked clothing. A large, well ventilated blood drying cabinet is preferred.

## Topic

- (F.T.4) **Electronic Media/Personal Data**

## Discussion

The search for a motive and to eliminate the potential that others were involved was at the forefront of this investigation. In the weeks following the incident, investigators from GPD and the FBI executed search warrants and subpoenas for the gunman's social media accounts, school records, personal records, and cell phone records. They also conducted multiple interviews of friends and family of the gunman.

Due to differences in state and federal rules, tasks were divided to ensure the highest level of efficiency. All electronic media returns were forwarded to the FBI to be analyzed by their cybercrime investigators.

## Recommendations

- (F.R.10) Clearly established roles and responsibilities should be established early into the investigative process when multiple agencies are sharing roles in the investigation.



**(F.R.11)** Frequent briefings should be held to share information and set timelines for completion of tasks.

**Topic**

**(F.T.5) Report Writing**

**Discussion**

There were multiple investigative reports completed by personnel from several of the local, state, and federal agencies that assisted with this investigation. These reports along with all supporting documents were forwarded to the Greenwood Police Department's lead investigator. A final report including: a timeline of events, autopsy reports, Coroner reports, interview statements, personal records collected, physical and digital evidence collected, and all facts/findings surrounding this case were forwarded to the Johnson County Prosecutor for review.

**Recommendations**

**(F.R.12)** Reports should be checked for accuracy and proper grammar prior to being submitted to the lead investigator.

**(F.R.13)** The timely completion of the report should balance the importance of conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation with the need to provide answers to the victims' families and the public in a timely manner.



# ANNEX G



## **ANNEX G. – Support Services First Responders**

### **Introduction**

The on scene investigation lasted nearly eleven hours and involved a large quantity of first responders from multiple agencies. It was necessary to provide food, hydration, break areas, and restrooms for these individuals. It was also necessary to consider the emotional trauma that many first responders were exposed to as a result of the sheer nature of the incident.

### **Topic**

**(G.T.1) Immediate Needs**

### **Discussion**

Within two hours of this incident the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, Central Indiana Police Foundation, and the Indianapolis FOP Auxiliary arrived with an assortment of food and beverages for the first responders.

### **Recommendations**

**(G.R.1)** Know in advance what resources are available to your agency that will provide basic needs to first responders during long lasting critical incidents.

**(G.R.2)** Ensure that first responders receive adequate relief during long lasting critical incidents so that basic needs can be met.

### **Topic**

**(G.T.2) Officers Stress Management**

### **Discussion**

In the days following this incident many officers experienced emotional distress as a direct result of their involvement in this incident. The Johnson County Critical Incident Stress Management Team consisting of trained public safety professionals and mental health professionals held a de-briefing for all first responders including dispatchers involved in this incident. Due to the number of public safety personnel affected it took eight days to organize and execute this de-briefing.

Greenwood Police Department personnel were referred to the cities EAP if further follow-up was required.





### Recommendations

- (G.R.3)**        Ensure that your agency has adequate resources in place to provide mental health assistance to first responders.
  
- (G.R.4)**        Agency administrators should encourage their personnel to participate in post incident stress management de-briefings, and to seek additional mental health treatment if required.



# ANNEX H



## **ANNEX H. – VICTIMS ASSISTANCE**

It is important to recognize that the term “victim” encompasses a wide variety of persons and their involvements during a critical incident. For the purpose of this incident, victims were recognized as any person who directly or indirectly experienced a negative impact as a result of the incident. In the days following this incident assistance, was provided to those experiencing emotional trauma, those who lost or left items behind, those who were injured, and the family members of those killed.

### **Topic**

**(H.T.1) Federal Assistance**

### **Discussion**

The Greenwood Police Department received several calls from victims who were in the mall at the time of the shooting and who were experiencing emotional trauma as a result of their involvement. Many of these victims were requesting referrals to mental health professionals. These individuals were directed to the Indianapolis FBI victim’s assistance advocate.

### **Recommendations**

**(H.R.1)** Agencies should prepare in advance and know what resources are available for victims of critical incidents in their region.

### **Topic**

**(H.T.2) Financial Assistance**

### **Discussion**

In the days following this incident many organizations, businesses, and individuals contacted the Greenwood Police Department requesting information on how to donate to the families of those injured and killed.

### **Recommendations**

**(H.R.2)** Contact the victims or their representative prior to releasing personal information or giving guidance on how to donate.



**(H.R.3)** Donations should be made directly to the victim's representative or established fund, and not to the investigating agency.

**Topic**

**(H.T.3) Personal Property Return**

**Discussion**

Multiple pieces of personal property were left behind in the food court when the shooting began. It was important that these items were returned to their rightful owners as soon as possible. Information was released to the media and via social media that anyone who left items behind could pick them up at the Greenwood Police Training Center on a specified date and time. During the pick-up times, the training center was adequately staffed with officers to assist with the large quantity of items being returned. Victim's assistance information was also provided to those retrieving property.

**Recommendations**

**(H.R.4)** Ensure that personal property left at the crime scene is collected, logged, and returned as soon as possible.

**(H.R.5)** Utilize the media to announce dates, times, and locations that property may be retrieved.

**(H.R.6)** Ensure there is adequate staffing for the quantity of items to be returned.

**(H.R.7)** Be prepared to take witness statements from those who did not remain at the scene.

**(H.R.8)** Provide victims assistance information.

**Topic**

**(H.T.4) Consulate Notification**

**Discussion**

Three of the victims in this incident were foreign nationals. It was important to notify their respective consulates as soon as possible.



## Recommendations

- (H.R.9)** Critical incidents resulting in the victimization of foreign nationals must be reported to the appropriate consulate as soon as possible. Additional victim's assistance may be available through the consulate.



## **CLOSING**

In summary, the public safety response to the July 17, 2022 active shooter incident that occurred at the Greenwood Park Mall in Greenwood Indiana was handled remarkably well. The coordinated efforts and cooperation among all agencies involved is a true testament of the importance of interoperability and teamwork. However, the variable that most affected the trajectory of this incident was the heroic actions of a legally armed citizen who neutralized the gunman in under 15 seconds. The actions of this citizen undoubtedly saved many lives.

Although the public safety response to this incident went remarkably well, it is imperative that we use this opportunity to learn not only from what we did well but also the things we could have done better. This report should serve as a learning tool to improve public safety responses to future active shooter incidents.

